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Abstract: Recent studies in economic development seek to establish that institutional 
quality is an important determinant of long-run living standards. Moreover, it appears 
that property rights institutions are causal for development whereas contracting 
institutions affect the nature of financial intermediation in the economy. I use these 
results to explore two questions. If property rights institutions matter for economic 
growth, can they help explain large-scale reform surprises? The reforms in Western 
Germany in 1948 are viewed as ‘miraculous’ whereas those in the early 1990s in the 
former Soviet transition economies are viewed as disappointing. I argue that the former 
had a limited task because they only had to restore existing property rights institutions 
whereas the latter had to create new ones and find new owners for assets. The second 
question is whether the persistence of variety in contracting institutions across countries 
that have developed successfully has implications for the design of financial and 
corporate governance reforms. 
 
JEL classification: P11, P14, P21 
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1  Introduction 
How do the quality and nature of institutions affect the efficacy of 
economic reforms? Economic reforms do not always work as expected. 
The economic reforms implemented in the Western zones of Germany in 
1948 were frequently described as having a ‘miraculous’ effect. The post-
communist economic reforms introduced in the early 1990s across the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union led 
to an unexpected collapse in output and protracted recovery. I shall argue 
that how well reforms work depends on their compatibility with the 
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institutions that exist in the economy. The surprise associated with each of 
these reform episodes suggests that this relationship is not well 
understood: the key difference between Germany in 1948 and Eastern 
Europe in 1990 is that in the former but not the latter there was 
institutional continuity and compatibility between the reforms and pre-
existing institutions.  
Much of the existing literature on large-scale reforms prompted by the 
post-communist experience has focused on the sequencing of reforms and 
the political economy of ‘big bang’ versus ‘gradualist’ strategies (e.g., 
Dewatripont and Roland, 1996; Roland, 2000). The aim of this paper is to 
redirect attention to the content of reforms and in particular to connect this 
debate to the recent literature in development economics, which seeks to 
identify the institutions that are causal in long-run capitalist development. 
Recent cross-country econometric analysis (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001) 
is widely viewed as having established that institutional quality is causal 
in determining living standards (e.g., Pande and Udry, 2005). More 
recently, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have sought to ‘unbundle’ 
institutions and clarify which institutions matter for which outcomes. In 
contrast to North (1981), who argued that both property rights institutions 
and contracting institutions were central to economic development, 
Acemoglu and Johnson find that it is property rights institutions that 
matter for living standards. Contracting institutions, on the other hand, 
appear to influence the form of the financial system, e.g. whether the stock 
market is important in the economy. 
An interpretation of the Acemoglu and Johnson finding is provided by 
a different tradition of inquiry in political science, which identifies a 
number of ‘varieties of capitalism’ (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2000). In the 
varieties of capitalism literature, the starting point is the co-existence of a 
set of highly developed economies operating in open financial and goods 
markets, which share secure property rights but which differ across a 
number of other institutional dimensions, one of which is the role played 
by the stock market. Other dimensions of difference are patterns of 
ownership concentration, the regulation and organization of the labour 
market, education and training institutions, and the nature of the welfare 
state. 
From this perspective, contracting institutions are a determinant of 
which variety of capitalism prevails but not of long-run growth. This may 
help to explain why in countries with different legal traditions, which 
form an important foundation for contracting institutions, successful 
development has nevertheless occurred. If successful development is 
consistent with a variety of contracting institutions, one hypothesis is that 
different contracting institutions influence comparative and not absolute 
advantage. This may also help to explain the persistence of these 
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differences in the face of increasing integration of product and capital 
markets. If this conjecture is correct, there may be unanticipated 
consequences from the application of a uniform set of reform measures. 
Opposition to large-scale reforms may not simply reflect vested interests 
but also have an efficiency rationale. 
In this paper, I explore the interaction between institutions and 
economic reforms by looking at the role of property rights institutions in 
helping to account for large-scale reform surprises and by examining 
whether the persistence of variation in contracting institutions across 
developed economies has implications for the design of financial and 
corporate governance reforms. Section 2 uses the empirical results of 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) as the basis for identifying the role of institutional 
quality in economic development and to separate the function of property 
rights institutions from that of contracting institutions in the operation 
and performance outcomes of capitalist economies. Section 3 compares the 
two examples of large-scale reform surprises introduced above: the 
Currency Reform in western Germany and the post-communist reforms in 
the former Soviet bloc economies. This comparison is used in Section 4 to 
examine the interaction between property rights institutions and reform 
outcomes. I contrast the continuity in property rights institutions and 
ownership structures in West Germany with the abandoning of the 
existing property rights institutions in the post-communist reforms in the 
transition economies. Consistent with the argument in Section 2, the 
countries that have done best are those that have created the most secure 
property rights. These countries have also attracted more foreign 
investment. Indeed the capitalism that is emerging in transition economies 
is unusual in its dependence on foreign owners to propel economic 
development. This is explored in Section 5. In Section 6, I extend the 
argument that reform design should be sensitive to institutions beyond 
the examples of large-scale reform by examining the interaction between 
contracting institutions and economic reforms. 
2 Property Rights Institutions and Contracting 
Institutions 
There has been a recent revival of interest in the role of institutions in 
long-run economic development (North, 1993). A very widely cited 
empirical paper is Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR, 2001). In this 
paper the authors provide econometric evidence for the causal role of 
institutional quality in growth. They propose an ingenious way of 
overcoming the central problems for inference presented by the small 
sample size of countries in the world, the limited within country variation 
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in institutions, the reverse causality from good economic performance to 
better institutions, the omitted variables likely to influence both 
institutional quality and growth, and the difficulty of measuring 
institutional quality. Their strategy is to find a variable that was a 
determinant of the quality of early institutions but that has no direct effect 
on current living standards. By selecting a sub-sample of countries in the 
world that had been colonized, they are able to use the disease 
environment faced by potential colonizers as their instrumental variable. 
The conjecture is that the disease environment affected the nature of the 
colonies that were established but has no direct effect on living standards 
today. They hypothesise that where the disease environment was 
conducive to European settlement, so-called settler colonies were 
established. Settlers replicated their home institutions, which were 
associated with secure property rights and with successful capitalist 
development. The persistence of these high quality institutions is reflected 
in current institutional quality. 
By contrast in places where the disease environment for Europeans 
made settlement hazardous, extractive states were set up with the main 
purpose of transferring resources back to the colonial power. Australia is 
an example of a settler colony in which institutions to enforce the rule of 
law were paramount. The Belgian Congo was an extractive colony, where 
the disease environment made it unattractive for the colonizers to settle 
and invest in replicating home institutions. To complete the argument, 
AJR point out that the disease environment at the time of potential 
settlement is not related to current living standards because on the one 
hand, indigenous populations were already largely immune to the 
diseases that killed Europeans and on the other that these diseases are no 
longer major killers.  
The magnitude of the estimated effect of institutions is large: AJR’s 
results suggest that improving Nigeria’s institutions to the level of Chile’s 
would produce a long run increase in Nigeria’s per capita income of up to 
seven-fold. This accounts for over 60% of the existing gap between these 
two countries. Although some doubts have emerged about the settler 
mortality data and some of the assumptions made by AJR in matching this 
data to the countries in the sample (see Albouy, 2005, and the response by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005), the judgement that potential 
settler mortality is a good instrumental variable for institutional quality 
has probably strengthened over time (e.g., Murray, 2006). More broadly, 
the consensus view presented by Pande and Udry (2005), who provide a 
fairly comprehensive survey of empirical studies conducted in the past 
decade, is that the accumulation of evidence from the cross country 
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studies supports the conclusion that institutional quality matters for long 
run growth1. 
In the studies surveyed by Pande and Udry, a range of variables are 
used to proxy institutional quality. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) follow 
up their earlier analysis by attempting to differentiate between two 
generic types of institutions and their effects. Property rights institutions 
are those that regulate the relationship between the producers and lenders 
in the economy on the one hand and on the other, the state or other groups 
in the economy with power, so-called elites. Contracting institutions 
regulate the relationship between two groups of private sector agents, the 
users of finance (producers) and those who supply it. They take issue with 
North’s view that it is a combination of so-called property rights 
institutions and the institutions that regulate private contracts that is 
crucial for development. 
As a proxy for the quality of property rights institutions Acemoglu and 
Johnson use a measure of the risk of expropriation of foreign investors and 
as a proxy for contracting institutions, a measure of the number of steps 
required to resolve an unpaid cheque. Contracting institutions are more 
costly when the degree of legal formalism is higher – as measured here by 
the number of steps taken to clear a bounced cheque. The empirical 
strategy for separating the impact of the two types of institution rests on 
finding a different instrumental variable for each institution. They first 
establish the intuition for their strategy, which rests on the role of 
European colonizers. The idea is that colonizers brought with them their 
legal institutions so that the identity of the colonial power determines the 
legal code of the colony. Moreover, legal formalism and hence contracting 
institutions vary across the different legal codes. They go on to argue, 
however, that the legal system introduced at colonization does not 
determine property rights institutions today. Rather, applying the logic 
from AJR, it was the disease environment facing potential settlers that 
affected whether a settler or extractive colony was established and hence 
the quality of property rights now – it had no effect on the nationality of 
potential colonizers and thus did not affect the degree of legal formalism 
observed today. Hence the nationality of the colonizer (and the legal code 
they brought with them) is the instrumental variable for legal formalism 
(contracting institutions) and the disease environment facing potential 
settlers (how colonization was carried out) is the instrumental variable for 
property rights institutions. 
After establishing the validity of the instrumental variables for each 
institution, the key results supporting the ‘unbundling’ hypothesis come 
                                                 
1 For recent evidence on the magnitude of the effect of institutions on growth using firm 
level data from about 100 countries, see Carlin et al. (2010). 
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from tests where both property rights and contracting institutions are 
included together in regressions with a performance measure as the 
dependent variable. This reveals that property rights institutions matter 
for GDP per capita, the ratio of investment to GDP, broad financial 
development as measured by the ratio of credit extended to the private 
sector (as a proportion of GDP) and stock market development, whereas 
contracting institutions matter only for the form of financial intermediation 
as proxied by stock market development. 
This finding resonates with a much older literature in economics 
associated with Gerschenkron (1962) and a current debate mainly in 
comparative political science (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which seek to 
account for the role of different types of financial institutions in the 
development of the advanced economies. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature focuses specifically on how to explain the coexistence of 
advanced economies at similar levels of development (and of property 
rights enforcement) with different clusters of institutions including 
financial institutions. Data collection exercises over the past decade (e.g., 
cross country measures of the structure of ownership of non-financial 
companies; the number of steps required to clear a cheque or evict a 
tenant) led by La Porta, Shleifer, Djankov and colleagues have confirmed 
the variation in contracting institutions even within the advanced OECD 
economies. 
3 Reform Surprises 
On the basis of the empirical support for the importance of property 
rights institutions in the development process, we turn to the possible role 
of these institutions in the efficacy of large-scale economic reforms. A 
famous example of an unexpectedly successful large-scale economic 
reform was the Currency Reform and associated liberalization measures 
introduced in the British and US administered zones of occupation of 
Germany in June 1948. At the time the economy was dominated by a 
complex form of barter trade, the vestiges of the Nazi command economy 
and the black market. Shortages of all kinds were pervasive and levels of 
absenteeism from work were very high (Carlin, 1989). The reforms were 
introduced on June 30th 1948 and in its report published on 3rd July, The 
Economist provides a vivid description of the immediate consequences: 
 
Housewives strolled down the streets gazing in astonishment at shop-windows – 
at shoes, leather handbags, tools, perambulators, bicycles, cherries in baskets, 
young carrots tied in neat bundles. In the early morning, farmers had been seen 
making their unaccustomed way into town with produce for sale, a little uncertain 
what were the legal channels for selling it.  
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On the third working day after the currency reform, manufacturers in Nuremberg 
said that absence from factories from all causes had fallen from 18 to 20 per cent to 
2 or 3 per cent. 
 
The reforms comprised a currency reform that replaced the existing 
Reichsmark with the Deutschmark and liberalized prices and wages. The 
Reichsmark had become useless as functioning money due to a 
combination of controlled prices, an expansion of the stock of money by 
the Nazi authorities and the low level of output. Following the collapse of 
the regime in 1945, the occupation authorities kept the price controls in 
place with the consequence that excess money was reflected in repressed 
rather than open inflation. The presence of dysfunctional money resulted 
in the development of elaborate networks of bilateral transactions as 
producers sought to re-establish supply chains after the collapse at the end 
of the war in a sophisticated industrial economy based on a complex 
division of labour (Carlin, 1989). Alongside this bilateral exchange or 
barter economy, a black market developed in which a range of 
commodities provided a means of exchange. The remainder of the 
economy continued to operate with controlled prices and with allocations 
directed by the occupation authorities (Abelshauser, 1975 and 2004). 
Figure 1 shows the path of industrial output from the fourth quarter of 
1945 to the third quarter of 1949. Modest recovery on the basis of the low-
level economic mechanisms described above is shown (see Carlin, 1989, 
for further details): from its nadir of less than one-fifth of the 1936 level, 
industrial output had recovered to over one-half by mid 1948 
(Abelshauser, 1975). The pace of the recovery of output picked up after the 
Currency Reform in mid 1948. However, the investment series provides a 
more convincing indicator of the change in the nature of economic 
activity. Gross investment in industry remained very weak until the 
Currency Reform: it was below the level required to maintain the net 
capital stock. Following the Currency Reform however, the level of 
investment jumped above its pre-war level and continued to grow 
strongly through 1949 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 - Western Germany: Industrial Output and Gross Investment, 1945:4-1949:3 
 
Sources: Abelshauser, 1975; Krengel, 1958; Carlin, 1989. 
 
The recovery of investment marked the return of long-term decision-
making by managers and the economy of western Germany began a 
process of rapid return to its long-term growth path (see Figure 2). Figure 
2 shows GDP per capita in constant Geary-Khamis dollars at purchasing 
power parity for the UK and West Germany over the period from 1900 to 
1990. Germany’s growth path is punctuated by the two wars and the 
Depression but returns rapidly to its long-run path after the Currency 
Reform (see also Eichengreen and Ritschl, 1997). 
 
Figure 2 - GDP per Capita (PPP), West Germany and the UK, 1900-1990 
 
Source: Maddison, 1995; Groningen database, 2005. 
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My second example of a reform surprise is the post-communist 
transition. Figure 3 presents long-run data from the same sources as 
Figure 2, this time for Austria, Czechoslovakia / Czech Republic and 
Hungary. The data runs from 1924 to 2005. These three economies were 
fairly similar in terms of living standards in the mid 1920s, when the gap 
between Austria and Czechoslovakia was similar to that between the UK 
and Germany. 
 
Figure 3 - GDP per Capita (PPP), Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary, 1924-2005 
 
Source: Maddison, 1995; Groningen database, 2006. 
 
The delayed post-war recovery in the communist economies and 
subsequent divergence in living standards from Austria after 1950 is clear 
from Figure 3. I focus on the post-communist reforms: output per capita 
dropped sharply and did not recover its pre-reform level for almost a 
decade. Although Austria itself was growing very slowly after 1990, as 
Fig. 3 illustrates reform in the Czech Republic and Hungary was not 
followed by a strong pull of these two economies back to their long-run 
growth path of GDP per capita as defined by Austria. 
Additional insight into the pattern of post-reform growth is provided 
by looking across regions within the transition economies. Figure 4 
provides regional data on GDP per capita in 1995 and 2006 compared with 
the EU average for three of the advanced transition economies: Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary, with Austria as the comparator. 
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Figure 4 - GDP per Capita by Region 1995 and 2006: EU average = 100 
 
Source: Eurostat NUTS2 Regional GDP per capita in PPP. 
Notes: In each country, regions are ordered from highest GDP pc in 1995 from left to right; 
regions are in the same order in 2006. 
 
Whilst persistent regional dispersion characterizes Austria as well as 
the transition economies, the striking feature of the three transition 
countries is that whereas the region containing the capital city converges 
strongly toward the EU average (or in the case of the Czech Republic 
toward the Vienna region’s GDP per capita), the other regions show much 
slower convergence. This pattern suggests that the weakness of the overall 
convergence of the Czech Republic and Hungary to Austria’s GDP per 
capita shown in Figure 3 is a phenomenon of the non-capital city regions. 
The substantial fall in GDP per capita following the post-communist 
reforms was common across the former Soviet bloc transition economies. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 5 shows the largest economy in each of 
three broad country groupings (central and eastern European countries 
including the Baltic states, south eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States) along with the weakest performers in the first and 
third groups, Lithuania and Tajikistan. The performance of East Germany 
is also shown. Transposed onto the graph is the performance of West 
Germany from 1948 to 1966 (with its 1936 level of GDP per capita set at 1).  
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Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy 
Database, June 2009,http://www.conference-board.org/economics/  
East Germany linked to St. Bundesamt (2009) Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Bruttowertschöpfung in den 
Ländern und Ost-West-Großraumregionen Deutschlands 1991 bis 2008. 
 
Just as a boom was not expected to follow the Currency Reform and 
price liberalization in West Germany, a collapse in output was not 
predicted for post-communist transition economies. The analysis in 
Section 2 highlights the importance of property rights institutions in 
economic growth. This suggests that poorly understood differences in the 
necessary institution-building of the respective reforms may help explain 
why the outcomes were unexpected. 
4 Property Rights Institutions and Large-Scale 
Reform Surprises 
Institutions are ‘the laws, informal rules, and conventions that give a 
durable structure to the social interactions among the members of a 
population’ (Bowles, 2004) and although economic reforms may change 
the rules overnight, as North points out, ‘the informal norms change only 
gradually. Since it is the norms that provide ‚legitimacy‛ to a set of rules, 
revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and 
performance will be different than anticipated’ (North, 1993). Two features 
of these definitions seem especially relevant for understanding the 
interaction between institutions and reforms. Both authors stress the 
importance of informal norms in addition to the law on the books and the 
Figure 5 - Post-reform GDP per capita (PPP). West Germany (1936=1) 1948-1966; 
Transition countries (1990=1) 
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formal institutional apparatus. They also hint that creating institutions is a 
slow business. 
In the case of the reforms in Germany in 1948, behaviour did change 
‘overnight’ and with it the functioning of the economy. As noted above, 
stocks of goods were brought out for sale, workers returned to regular 
working patterns and firms began to invest in new plant and equipment. 
In the wake of the post-communist reforms, the change in the rules 
produced a collapse in output and slow recovery. As Figures 4 and 5 
show, unlike West Germany, even the most successful post-communist 
transition economies did not return rapidly to a long-run growth path 
defined by pre-war comparators after the implementation of large-scale 
reform. I argue that the reforms in Germany worked well and quickly 
because what they had to do – in institution-building terms – was modest. 
The function of the reforms was to enable the pre-existing institutions of a 
capitalist economy to function again. The task was not to create new rules 
of the game but to restore old and well-understood ones. By contrast, the 
reforms in transition had a much larger job to do – to create the 
institutions of a capitalist economy and the associated norms of economic 
behaviour where they had not existed for at least a generation.  
There has been much debate among economic historians as to the 
significance of the 1948 reforms in West Germany’s post-war renaissance 
(e.g., Abelshauser, 1975, 2004; Ritschl, 1985; Buchheim, 1988). Both the 
time series data and contemporary reports documenting economic 
behaviour point toward two key ‘turning points’ in the process of 
recovery. The first was in 1947 with the announcement of the Truman 
doctrine. This confirmed that the western zones of Germany were to be 
rehabilitated as a market economy, on the economic strength of which the 
US and its allies could depend as a bulwark against communism. The 
objective of promoting West Germany’s reintegration in the international 
trading system within the US’s sphere of influence displaced both the 
original intention in the British zone to strengthen the residual war-time 
command economy along planning lines and of the Americans to de-
industrialize their zone and return it to an agrarian economy. The Truman 
doctrine and associated economic policy decisions created the pre-
conditions for the restoration of growth but for this to happen would 
require that functioning money be reintroduced and prices and wages be 
liberalized from the levels fixed in 1936. This was accomplished by the 
reforms of mid 1948: the second turning point.  
Placed in the context of the analysis of the role of institutions in growth 
discussed in Section 2, it was the Truman doctrine that first signalled 
enhanced security of property rights in post-war western Germany. The 
state (through the governing Allied authorities) indicated that it would 
not expropriate the owners of private property. This was reinforced by the 
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redistributive effects of the Currency Reform in which debts (government 
and private) were massively written down in value but the real value of 
equity was maintained (Carlin, 1996). Observers at the time noted how 
firms sought to maintain their old relationships with suppliers and 
customers via complicated bilateral trades between the collapse of the 
economy in 1945 and the Currency Reform2. The growth of economic 
activity was restricted by the absence of clarity about property rights and 
of functioning money but the underlying relationships between private 
sector agents were largely intact and formed the basis on which rapid 
growth could later take place. 
Recent research has confirmed continuity in the identity of owners of 
German companies through the interwar and Nazi periods into the post-
war years (Fohlin, 2005). Ownership concentration increased through the 
Nazi period as (gentile) founder families were assisted in retaining 
control. Continuity in personnel has been demonstrated in owners3, 
managers, the chambers of commerce and industry and in the employers’ 
and industry associations (Erker, 1999; Joly, 2000; Wiesen, 2001). Fohlin 
reports that ‚the deconcentration efforts of the allies in the early aftermath 
of World War II – both in terms of equity ownership and industrial 
organization – failed generally over the long run‛ (p.13). This is even the 
case in sectors targeted by the Allied authorities for post-war 
‘deconcentration’ and ‘denazification’: steel, coal, chemicals, insurance 
and banks (Borkin, 1978; Erker, 1999; Feldman, 2001; Frei, 2003; 
Horstmann, 1991; Pohl, 1974). With owners and managers largely in place, 
investment decisions were made once expropriation by the state had been 
ruled out, functioning money was again available, and prices could be set 
to deliver the required profit margins.  
The same fundamental rules of the game in terms of the relationship 
between the private sector and the state and between private sector agents 
were re-established in post-war West Germany as in the pre-war period: a 
capitalist economy was restored with contracting institutions based on the 
existing civil law tradition. Moreover as we have seen, many of the 
informal norms and the relationships sustained by them had remained 
intact albeit through inefficient non-market mechanisms. The Currency 
Reform served to reactivate pre-existing property rights institutions and 
                                                 
2 The scope for and limits to recovery in the period between the collapse and the 
Currency Reform are analysed using Kornai’s concept of ‘autonomous control’ in Carlin 
(1989). 
3 Fohlin (2005) explains that the difficulties in providing a comprehensive documentation 
of this arise because firm-level ownership data are largely absent for the pre World War 
II period – public companies issued bearer shares and there was no requirement to make 
public the identity of owners.  
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allowed ‘business as usual’ to return. The rapid response of output and 
investment reflected this. By contrast, the post-communist reforms in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were to require a ‘Great 
Transformation’ (Kornai, 2006). There was a discontinuity in institutions 
with new rules of the game coming into play. For most transition 
economies property rights institutions played no significant role in the 
economy prior to the reforms. 
The scale of the task in creating property rights institutions that had to 
be accomplished by the post-communist reforms was underestimated. 
John Williamson’s characterization of the Washington consensus (1990) 
devotes just two sentences to the issue of property rights: ‚In the United 
States property rights are so well entrenched that their fundamental 
importance for the satisfactory operation of the capitalist system is easily 
overlooked. I suspect, however, that when Washington brings itself to 
think about the subject, there is general acceptance that property rights do 
indeed matter.‛ In the prevailing reform circles priority was given to 
macroeconomic stabilization and to the swift replacement of the state by 
private owners of enterprises. When combined with freeing prices and 
weakening governments, the presumption was that a space would be 
opened up in which a market economy would spontaneously emerge (see 
also Roland, 2000).  
One of the under-explored aspects of the post-Soviet transition is the 
reasons for the fall in output. Many accounts of the output collapse focus 
on relative price changes (such as the withdrawal of subsidies and the 
move to world prices in international trade) or on excessively tight 
macroeconomic policy. Neither of these explanations refers to the role of 
institutions: the analysis applies standard tools of policy analysis as would 
be appropriate in a functioning market economy. By contrast, the term 
‘disorganization’ has been used in models that attempt to capture the 
micro-mechanisms behind the output collapse caused by the shift from 
one mode of economic organization to another (e.g., Blanchard and 
Kremer, 1997, Roland and Verdier, 1999). Blanchard and Kremer note that 
under planning, production was organized around bilateral relationships 
between producers and purchasers in the sense that each producer had a 
relationship with only one buyer of a particular product. Knowledge 
about and availability of alternative suppliers was largely absent. Given a 
complex division of labour, many inputs are required for an enterprise to 
produce a given product. Following the cessation of central planning, 
enterprises had to secure access to each input in the absence of the pre-
existing administrative arrangements. The problem is that in the absence 
of planning, suppliers have improved alternative opportunities (e.g., to 
supply new private firms) and the state firm becomes enmeshed in a series 
of bargaining problems. Since such problems exist for all inputs, the more 
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complex is production, the larger the number of such bargaining problems 
and the more likely a given product cannot be produced. Hence, the 
expected fall in output is greater for more complex production processes. 
Roland and Verdier suggest other mechanisms that may have produced 
the fall in output: the process of finding new suppliers (and customers) 
was inhibited by search frictions and investment specificity. Hence 
relationship-specific investments could only occur after a new long-term 
partner had been found. In the interim, output would fall. The role of 
disorganization in the output collapse has not been quantified but 
corroborative evidence of its importance is provided by the fact that the 
largest output falls across the transition economies occurred in 1991, the 
year when trading arrangements in the CMEA were abandoned and trade 
took place at world prices (Blanchard, 1997). 
Unlike the Chinese reforms where a dual-track strategy retained the 
‘plan track’ whilst allowing a market track to develop alongside, the 
former Soviet countries chose a single track reform, which involved a leap 
to a capitalist economy. This is the sense in which Kornai (2006) labels the 
Chinese reforms as ‘slow’ and the former Soviet bloc ones as ‘fast’. Qian 
(2003) provides an analysis of Chinese reform success in the absence of 
clarity of property rights that in many ways is consistent with the 
arguments presented here. The dual track provided institutional 
continuity and allowed the Chinese to avoid a ‘transitional recession’ as 
Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
Figure 6 - GDP per Capita and Large-Scale Reforms: China, USSR and Russian 
Federation, 1970-2004 
 
Source: Groningen Total Economy Database,  2006,  http://www.ggdc.net; GDP per capita 
measured at PPP in 1990 Geary-Khamis International Dollars. 
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Both stand in stark contrast to post-war West Germany where the 
norms of a capitalist economy had legitimacy and where firms had owners 
and managers who were ready to resume activities. In contrast to Eastern 
Europe, supplier-producer relationships in Germany were also largely 
intact – as noted above, elaborate chains of bilateral arrangements had 
helped to sustain such relationships during the interregnum before the 
Currency Reform. The institutional vacuum at the outset of the East 
European transition helps explain why transition has proved more 
difficult with much slower catch up than had been widely anticipated at 
the outset. As we shall see in the next section, it also helps explain why 
foreign owners are playing such an important role in the form of 
capitalism that is emerging in these economies. 
5 Security of Property Rights and the Role of Foreign 
Owners in Transition 
Successful transition depends on solving the problem of the 
relationship between the state and firms – both in the sense of limiting the 
threat of expropriation by the state (or elites) of private firms and in 
preventing the state from bailing out unprofitable activities. It also 
depends on finding new owners for productive assets. Not only are new 
rules required but the roles of the different players in the game have to be 
allocated as well. Two distinct mechanisms operated in the allocation 
process: the creation of new firms and the privatization of existing large 
enterprises. As it is emerging in the post-Soviet economies, capitalism in 
transition is unusual in its dependence on foreign ownership of large 
firms.  
The fifteen years of transition have provided much evidence of the 
emergence of a process of creative destruction ‘from below’. Small-scale 
privatization of shops, permission for new businesses to open, the 
introduction of competition from imports and limits on the bail-outs of 
loss-making firms by government produced the environment in which a 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction could develop. All firms 
and potential firms faced innovation opportunities and there is some 
evidence that firms facing rivals innovated more – more than monopolists 
and more than those facing a lot of competition (Carlin et al., 2004). The 
many empty niches in small scale production and services began to be 
filled. A multi-country study of exit, entry and within-firm productivity 
growth reports that resources are moving in transition economies to new 
and to more productive firms (Bartelsman et al., 2004), confirming the 
productivity enhancing character of creative destruction. The study also 
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found that the process was less effective in the least advanced transition 
economy in their sample (Romania). 
But the emergence and growth of new ab initio firms was too slow to 
prevent the collapse of aggregate output when the planned allocations of 
inputs and outputs were abandoned both within each economy and at the 
international level. Finding effective owners for large firms proved more 
problematic than stimulating the creation of new small ones. A wide 
variety of methods of privatization were implemented across the region 
and a large body of empirical evidence has accumulated from tests of the 
effects of privatization on enterprise performance. Hanousek et al. (2007) 
summarize the results from the past fifteen years, which range from the 
agnostic (e.g., Bevan et al., 1999, report a wide variety of results with no 
systematic impact of privatization on performance), through the mildly 
positive findings of Megginson and Netter (2001) from an assessment of 
studies of privatization across the world, to the firmer conclusion of 
Shirley and Walsh (2000) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) that 
privatization has a positive effect on performance. Hanousek et al. point to 
three key problems with the studies of privatization effects in transition: 
the evaluation of short-run effects only, variable data quality, and the 
unsystematic treatment or neglect of selection and associated endogeneity 
problems due to the design of privatization programmes in which 
enterprises of different quality were treated differently. 
The most recent comprehensive evaluation of the effects of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises in transition economies is Estrin 
et al. (2009). Their conclusions reflect evidence coming from more recent 
studies that deal better with the problems described above. This newer 
evidence suggests that it cannot safely be concluded that privatization per 
se has a marked positive effect on firm performance. However, the earlier 
evidence that foreign owners have a positive effect on performance 
(especially when the foreign owner is an industrial firm and when it has a 
strategic stake) survives more recent testing. The size of the effect is 
smaller in some more recent studies than previous ones suggested, where 
proper corrections were not made in the estimation procedure for the 
likely purchase of better firms by foreign owners. These new results serve 
to highlight the difficulty of finding owners, managers and effective 
governance structures for large firms. They indicate that foreign strategic 
owners are the only types who produce clear performance improvements 
as compared with continued state ownership.  
AJR use the threat of expropriation of foreign firms as their indicator of 
property rights protection and find that strong property rights bring high 
GDP per capita: institutions cause development. An interesting twist to 
this hypothesis from the transition experience is that there is growing 
evidence of the way the presence of foreign firms directly affects 
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productivity levels. As better quality institutions have developed, the 
presence of foreign firms has increased and the productivity levels of 
foreign-owned firms are higher than those of domestic ones. What was not 
anticipated was the extent to which foreign owners would be relied on to 
raise productivity in large firms. 
In comparisons of the role of foreign affiliates in turnover and 
employment in manufacturing and services in OECD countries, data for 
three transition countries is reported (Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) for 2001/2. For services, these three countries rank in the top six 
countries (out of 19 or 20) for the share of foreign affiliates in turnover and 
employment and in the top eight countries (out of 21 or 22) for 
manufacturing (OECD, 2005a)4. In a completely different data-set covering 
firms listed on the world’s stock exchanges, the advanced transition 
economies stand out in the extent of the presence of foreign-owned firms 
amongst listed firms and in the size of their stakes. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are in the top three out of four places on each 
measure (data-set from Carlin et al., 2007).  
In some of the smaller advanced transition economies, foreign-owned 
firms dominate the landscape among larger firms. For example, in the 
Czech Republic in a sample covering 70% of employment in large firms in 
industry (with more than 100 employees), one half of employment is in 
foreign-owned firms in 2000 (Sabirianova et al., SST, 2005a, 2005b). Even 
in the much larger and more closed economy of Russia, almost one-fifth of 
employment in large firms in industry is in foreign-owned ones.  
To understand the implications for the economy of foreign ownership, 
it is necessary to disentangle three channels: Do foreign firms have higher 
productivity because foreign owners are able to buy the most productive 
domestic firms? Does ownership by a foreign company raise the 
productivity of domestic firms they acquire (or of domestic assets in 
green-field operations) bringing it closer to the world frontier? Does 
foreign ownership affect the productivity of related firms in the host 
economy? 
Relatively few studies have been able to provide evidence on these 
questions because of the demanding requirements on data. SST’s study of 
the Czech Republic and Russia is an important bench-mark but judging 
the extent to which what they find represents the broader picture across 
transition must wait for replication studies in other countries. The 
evidence across transition economies shows that productivity levels of 
foreign-owned firms are significantly higher than those of domestic 
private and state-owned firms (see, for example the studies cited in SST 
2005b). From their data, SST estimate that foreign owned firms are much 
                                                 
4 For further discussion of the data, see OECD (2005b). 
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more efficient (i.e., have higher multi-factor productivity) than state-
owned firms, with the range for the Czech Republic being from 30 to 90% 
higher and in Russia from 20 to 170% higher depending on the estimation 
method used. Domestically owned firms are found to be only about 10% 
more efficient than state-owned ones in the Czech Republic and not 
clearly distinguishable in Russia. 
Their results indicate that although foreign firms tend to acquire more 
productive domestic firms, this ‘cherry picking’ effect is of relatively 
minor quantitative significance in accounting for the superior performance 
of foreign owned firms. They find that foreign firms enter at a higher level 
of efficiency than domestic firms and catch up over time to the 
productivity frontier as defined by the best-performing foreign-owned 
firms in the industry in the host country. In a given industry, domestic 
firms do not catch up to the frontier. As a consequence, foreign firms 
increasingly displace domestic firms in the upper part of the efficiency 
distribution of firms. Based on existing evidence large domestic owned 
firms find it difficult to catch up to the international productivity frontier 
and this is not helped by the presence of foreign firms in the same 
industry - contrary to what has been found for firms in the UK in the 
presence of foreign-owned counterparts (Griffith et al., 2003). Catch-up in 
the large-firm sector is therefore dependent on the direct productivity 
raising effect of the presence of foreign owned firms. One implication – 
given the limits to the supply of potential owners in the world economy – 
is that aggregate catch-up will be easier for smaller than for larger 
economies. More broadly, a key question is how the presence of foreign 
firms affects institution-building itself. 
6 Institutions and Economic Reforms Interact: 
Contracting Institutions 
An understanding of the role of institutions is relevant not only to the 
explanation of large-scale reform surprises but also to the design of reform 
programmes such as corporate governance and financial sector reform 
initiatives. I return to Acemoglu and Johnson’s core finding that countries 
with a lower degree of legal formalism tend to have bigger stock markets 
but that there is no significant relationship between legal formalism and 
economic development or overall financial development as measured by 
the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP. They suggest that a high 
level of legal formalism does not prevent development because private 
agents can find ways of mitigating its effects. For example debt may be 
substituted for equity as a source of external finance since debt contracts 
are cheaper to enforce where contracting institutions are weaker or agents 
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will rely more on informal relationships (implicit contracts). This is not 
possible in the case of property rights institutions, where the role of the 
state is paramount. The conjecture that the variation in contracting 
institutions reflects cross-country differences in specialization in 
production suggests that there may be efficiency reasons for their 
persistence. If this is the case, the implications for reform will be different 
from those associated with contracting institutions that are simply costly. 
By comparing the patenting activities of firms in two advanced 
economies with very different contracting institutions, we get a hint as to 
the role such cross-country differences may play. Germany is 
characterized by a relatively high degree of legal formalism: there are 50% 
more legal procedures involved in resolving a bad cheque than is the case 
in the USA. Figure 7 displays the pattern of patenting across industries for 
Germany and the US using a patent specialization index calculated from 
the patents registered at the European Patent Office in 1992-94 for 12 
countries. Industries are ranked in the figure from the top according to the 
scientific content of patents. A positive value of the specialization index in 
the jth industry in country k means that this country’s patenting activity is 
more concentrated in industry j than is the case on average across the 
other eleven countries. As Figure 7 shows, the specialization indexes for 
these two countries are strongly negatively correlated: the science-
intensive industries of information technology, semi-conductors and 
biotechnology are in the top six industries by patent registrations for the 
USA and in the bottom four for Germany. Germany’s patent specialization 
is highest in civil engineering and transport equipment industries which 
are in the bottom three in the USA. The scientific content of patents is 
relatively low in these industries.  
How does the specialization pattern in innovation relate to the contrast 
between the contracting institutions in these two economies? One 
hypothesis is that some contracting institutions are better suited to some 
kinds of activities than others and hence, contracting institutions persist 
where they add value. Contracting institutions with low transactions costs 
are associated with common law codes, developed stock markets and 
dispersed ownership structures in large companies. These may be better 
suited to activities that rely on information disclosure and appraisal by 
many, such as is the case when radically new technologies are being 
developed (Allen and Gale, 1999). By contrast, for other activities where 
the involvement of related firms is necessary in the innovation process 
(e.g., other firms in the supply chain or firms in the same industry in the 
case of industry standard setting), detailed monitoring by a bank or by a 
large shareholder may be more efficient. This is likely to be the case in 
mature industries characterized by incremental innovation and the 
diffusion of platform technologies (e.g., Casper and Whitley, 2004). 
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Figure 7 - Patent Specialization in USA and Germany, 1992-4 
 
Source: Data supplied by Thomas Cusack, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. 
 
In related work using industry level data for a sample of advanced 
economies, Carlin and Mayer (2003) find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that contracting institutions matter for comparative advantage. 
This is in line with the specialization pattern for the USA and Germany 
shown by the patent data. Carlin and Mayer find that for the advanced 
economies above average accounting disclosure is associated with above 
average growth and R&D in industries that are skill-intensive and equity-
intensive. As an example, accounting standards in Denmark are below the 
average of the advanced economies whilst those in Finland are above 
average, i.e., there is less disclosure of information to shareholders in 
Denmark than in Finland. Bank and ownership concentration are similar. 
The above result would predict higher growth in Finland in equity 
dependent industries than in Denmark. In the study, the four industries 
with the highest level of equity dependence (measured in the USA, which 
is excluded from the econometric analysis so as not to bias the results) are 
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instruments, electrical machinery, plastics and non-electrical machinery. 
In Finland, growth in all of these industries increased during the 1980s 
and rose again sharply in electrical machinery in the 1990s. By contrast, 
Denmark’s growth declined in these four industries during both the 1980s 
and 1990s. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, equity dependent 
industries grew faster through a period of technological shocks in the 
country with the better accounting disclosure. 
Traditional theories of comparative advantage would emphasize the 
natural resource endowment of Finland relative to Denmark as a source of 
advantage in resource intensive industries such as wood products and 
furniture. But the relative growth of these industries accelerated in 
Denmark, not Finland. Over this period it appears that measures of the 
financial structure of the two countries were more relevant to the 
comparative performance of their industries than were the underlying 
resource endowments. Allen et al. (2005) use cross country data to show 
an association between the strong presence of the stock market in the 
economy and the presence of knowledge and intangible asset based firms 
and between a ‘bank-based’ system and physical-asset intensive firms5. 
The cross country data on institutions assembled over the past decade 
confirm that features associated with contracting institutions including 
ownership structures, creditor and minority shareholder protection, 
accounting standards, the size and turnover of the stock market and the 
concentration of the banking system vary widely across the rich countries. 
These differences also appear persistent, which may be due to the power 
of the vested interests that benefit from them6 and / or to the role these 
differences play in determining comparative advantage.  
If reforms are to be properly designed and to have their intended effect, 
we need to understand the reasons for persistent differences in contracting 
institutions, the functions they perform and the forms of abuse to which 
they are open. This is highlighted by recent fraud cases in the USA and 
Europe, Enron in the US in 2001 and Parmalat in Italy in 2004. Coffee 
(2005) shows that in each case, the nature of the fraud is intimately related 
to the structure of ownership and the associated agency problem, which 
are in turn related to the contracting institutions in place. In the case of 
Enron, the fraud centred on the incentives for managers to manipulate 
earnings so as to influence the share price. Such incentives are strong in a 
dispersed ownership system where high powered incentive contracts for 
managers that link their compensation to the share price have become an 
important mechanism to align the interests of owners (the principal) and 
managers (their agents).   
                                                 
5 Further evidence along these lines is presented in Binh et al. (2006).  
6 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) for a trenchant argument of this kind. 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol.1, Issue 1 -  Spring 2010, Article 2 
Copyright © 2010 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 23 
 
By contrast in the case of Parmalat, the agency conflict is different. In 
the block-holder ownership system prevalent in countries with higher 
legal formalism, the agency conflict is not between the owners and the 
managers but between the minority and majority shareholders. The block-
holder is a controlling owner with the incentive and the resources to 
directly monitor the manager, which diminishes the standard principal 
agent problem. Fraud takes the form of appropriation of resources by the 
block-holder (sometimes referred to as tunnelling) and is reflected in the 
manipulation of the balance sheet rather than the earnings statement. 
In the case of Enron, a reform response was implemented quickly in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Given the nature of the fraud, the focus of the 
reform was on limiting the scope for earnings manipulation by managers. 
One aim was to improve the effectiveness of the ‘gate-keepers’, i.e., the 
auditors, securities analysts and credit-rating agencies in deterring 
earnings management (Coffee, 2005). Specifically, auditors now have to 
report to an independent audit committee rather than to management. 
A less focused discussion has characterized reform proposals in 
Europe. Reform through regulation appears intrinsically more 
problematic in the block-holder system because it is the owner who 
perpetrates the fraud. This makes it more difficult to design improvements 
in the role of the auditors along the lines of Sarbanes-Oxley. The European 
Union itself faces a much more complex reform task than does the US once 
it is recognized that different variants of contracting institutions exist 
across its jurisdiction, which includes countries with common law and 
different variants of civil law (French, German and Scandinavian). A 
recent study by Dyck and Zingales (2004) provides estimates of the private 
benefits of control (i.e., the value extracted by controlling share-holders in 
excess of their stake) in firms across countries. Their findings confirm 
differences associated with legal origin, with higher private benefits in 
civil law systems than in common law ones. However, they find that the 
significance of legal origin is much diminished by the inclusion of proxies 
of other institutional checks and balances in particular, press freedom and 
norms of tax compliance.  
One conclusion from this comparison is that if corporate governance 
reforms are to be well designed much more needs to be known about the 
role played by different contracting institutions in economic performance. 
Within the European context, diversity rather than harmonization of 
regulation is almost certainly appropriate so as to allow firms to locate and 
incorporate where they can make best use of their capabilities. This 
conclusion is reinforced to the extent that there is complementarity 
between aspects of the financial structure and, for example, the labour 
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market or skill formation system7 and to the extent that non-financial 
institutions such as a free media and tax compliance can substitute for 
regulation. 
7 Conclusions 
Countries that have successfully developed as capitalist economies 
have solved the problem of the relationship between the state and the 
private sector better than other countries. Yet in other respects their 
current institutions differ markedly, with roots apparently stretching far 
back into history such as those defined by the nature of the legal system. 
There is some support for the idea that variation in contracting institutions 
is related to patterns of specialization and hence to comparative advantage 
across countries. If this is so, then reforms aimed at harmonization may 
have unanticipated effects on resource allocation and performance. It also 
seems that the pathologies associated with different contracting 
institutions vary and call for different reform remedies. 
When the currency reform took place in West Germany in 1948 
dramatic effects were observed not because the reform instantly created 
institutions where there were none but because it supplied the key to 
unblock the functioning of the pre-existing formal and informal 
institutions, including confirming the legitimacy of existing owners of 
firms. Transition in the former Soviet bloc countries has proved much 
slower and much more costly than policy-makers or economists 
anticipated. A view has emerged that this large-scale reform surprise was 
due to the neglect of the role of institutions in the initial analysis and 
design of the reforms. In this paper, I have attempted to put flesh on the 
bones of this argument by (a) noting the implications of the single track 
strategy in which old rules were abandoned altogether; (b) separating the 
role of property rights institutions from contracting institutions and 
emphasizing that successful capitalism requires getting the relationship 
right between the state and private agents; (c) highlighting the problem of 
finding effective owners for large firms and showing how foreign owners 
have filled the gap. 
Better protection of foreign investors is a marker for good property 
rights institutions and progress in transition is consistent with this. 
However, it was not anticipated at the outset of transition that foreign 
owners would themselves play such a pivotal role in directly raising 
productivity. We now need to understand the implications of reliance on 
                                                 
7 Such arguments are set out in Hall and Soskice (2001) and Carlin (2009); in the latter, 
more recent data on ownership structures and corporate governance reforms are 
provided. 
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foreign firms and to find out whether the nationality of owners matters for 
development. The interplay between the state, foreign owners and 
domestic agents in creating well functioning norms of behaviour remains 
to be understood. The findings to date suggest the following questions: 
Why are large domestic owned firms unable to learn more readily from 
their foreign-owned rivals? Is the weakness of regional convergence 
within transition economies (as illustrated, for example, in Figure 4) 
related to the role of foreign ownership perhaps because of its limited 
impact in improving institutions across the economy? What is the actual 
and potential contribution to aggregate catch-up of the new firm sector 
and is this where large indigenous domestically owned firms will emerge 
from? Transition economies joined the capitalist economy as it entered a 
phase of intensified globalization and much remains to be learned from 
their experiences. 
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